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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Integrated Solutions, Inc., appeals an order dismissing its 
state law claims against Service Support Specialties, Inc., 
and certain individuals working for that company 
(collectively "Service Specialties"). The district court 
concluded that Integrated lacked standing to pursue the 
state law claims because its purchase of the claims from a 
trustee in bankruptcy was void ab initio under New Jersey 
law. On appeal, Integrated argues that federal law preempts 
the New Jersey state law prohibition against assigning 
prejudgment tort claims and permits a bankruptcy trustee 
to assign tort claims in executing its duties to liquidate and 
distribute the bankruptcy estate. We disagree and will 
affirm. 
 
                                2 
I. 
 
On July 22, 1994, Machine Technology, Inc. filed a 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Before filing for bankruptcy protection, Machine 
Technology had financed its operations through loans from 
both Midlantic Bank and United Jersey Bank. The debt was 
secured by separate security agreements in assets such as 
accounts, inventory, machinery and equipment. On 
September 6, 1994, Integrated purchased certain assets of 
Machine Technology through the banks which held security 
interests in the assets. 
 
On August 1 and 2, 1994, certain individual defendants 
who were former Machine Technology employees entered 
Machine Technology's offices and took or copied various 
documents, diagrams, specifications and drawings of an 
allegedly proprietary nature. On August 3, these individual 
defendants incorporated Service Specialties. Less than one 
week later, Service Specialties opened for business and 
began servicing Machine Technology accounts until 
September 6, when Integrated purchased the Machine 
Technology assets from the banks. 
 
Integrated filed a complaint in the district court alleging 
a series of state law claims and a federal copyright 
infringement claim against Service Specialties and the 
individual defendants.1 Integrated specifically claimed that 
the defendants had misappropriated Machine Technology 
assets, used these assets to set up Service Specialties, and 
were unlawfully competing with Integrated. Integrated also 
sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants 
from destroying and concealing documents and 
information, using confidential commercial information, 
infringing on Integrated copyrights, and engaging in unfair 
competition during the suit. On March 15, 1995, the 
district court denied Integrated's request for an injunction 
on the ground that Integrated was not "a successor in 
interest to MTI [Machine Technology], did not purchase all 
general intangibles of MTI, and thus [had] no standing to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Integrated stated causes of action for unfair competition, breach of the 
duty of loyalty, misappropriation of confidential information, interference 
with contractual relations, conversion, and replevin. 
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assert claims which MTI might have had against defendants 
for misappropriation of confidential information." Integrated 
Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support Specialties, Inc., No. 94- 
4953, slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. March 15, 1995). 
 
In an effort to cure its standing problem, Integrated 
subsequently purchased all of Machine Technology's 
remaining assets from Machine Technology's bankruptcy 
trustee. According to the Bill of Sale, Integrated purchased, 
inter alia, all general intangibles, all intellectual property, 
and "[a]ll claims and causes of action; including the right to 
recover for any past and future damages, arising out of or 
relating to the Assets . . . ." J.A. at 2615-16. This purchase 
and sale was authorized and approved by the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
 
In response, Service Specialties filed a motion for 
summary judgment seeking the dismissal of Integrated's 
state law claims. Service Specialties argued that the 
bankruptcy trustee's sale of Machine Technology's claims 
violated New Jersey law which prohibited assigning 
prejudgment tort claims and hence, Integrated had no 
standing to pursue the state law causes of action. The 
district court agreed and dismissed Integrated's state law 




On appeal, Integrated argues that New Jersey's common 
law prohibition against assigning state tort law claims 
before judgment is preempted by federal bankruptcy law. 
New Jersey law is preempted, Integrated maintains, 
because by preventing the sale of prejudgment tort claims 
belonging to the estate, New Jersey law serves to defeat a 
primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code: namely, the 
expeditious liquidation and distribution of the bankruptcy 
estate to its creditors. As such, Integrated concludes, New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court also concluded that Integrated had standing to 
pursue its copyright claim because that claim was freely assignable 
under federal law. The parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal of 
the copyright claim in order to expedite our review of the district court's 
dismissal of the state law claims. 
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Jersey law must yield to the conflicting federal interest 
under the Supremacy Clause. 
 
Our review is plenary. In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1372 




Whether federal bankruptcy law preempts New Jersey 
state law prohibiting the assignment of prejudgment tort 
claims requires us to resolve three separate questions: (1) 
Does New Jersey law prohibit the assignment of 
prejudgement tort claims?; (2) Are a debtor's prejudgment 
tort claims "property of the estate" under 11 U.S.C. § 541?; 
and (3) Did Congress intend to preempt state law 
restrictions on the assignability of tort claims under federal 




The relevant New Jersey statute dealing with 
assignability is section 2A:25-1, which provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
All contracts for the sale and conveyance of real estate, 
all judgments and decrees recovered in any of the 
courts of this state or of the United States or in any of 
the courts of any other state of the United States and 
all choses in action arising in contract shall be 
assignable, and the assignee may sue thereon in his 
own name. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:25-1. Because the statute does not 
address causes of action arising from tort claims, we look 
to case law for guidance. New Jersey courts have 
consistently held that, as a public policy matter, tort claims 
cannot be assigned before judgment. Village of Ridgewood 
v. Shell Oil Co., 673 A.2d 300, 307-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1996); Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1991) ("[I]n New Jersey, as a matter of public 
policy, a tort claim cannot be assigned."); East Orange 
Lumber Co. v. Feiganspan, 199 A. 778-79 (N.J. 1938); see 
also Conopco, Inc. v. McCreadie, 826 F. Supp. 855, 865-67 
(D.N.J. 1993) ("It is clear that under New Jersey law, choses 
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in action arising out of tort are not assignable prior to 
judgment."). 
 
Integrated concedes this general principle, but argues, 
without citation, that New Jersey's non-assignability rule 
does not apply to intentional torts or in the bankruptcy 
context. To bolster its argument, Integrated contends that 
the non-assignment rule "has never been expanded to 
intentional torts . . . or to persons appointed and acting 
under the authority of the federal bankruptcy statute." 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 5. Integrated, however, points to no 
support for its argument that the rule is intended to be 
limited in the manner it suggests, nor have we found any 
such limit in the case law. As such, we find Integrated's 
attempts to place its tort claims outside the New Jersey 
rule without support and unpersuasive. New Jersey law 
clearly forbids the assignment of prejudgment tort claims, 




The Bankruptcy Code defines a bankrupt's estate broadly 
to encompass all kinds of property, including intangibles 
and causes of action. As § 541 reads in pertinent part: 
 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 
302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate 
is comprised of all the following property, wherever 
located and by whomever held: 
 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c)(2) of 
this section, all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case. . . . 
 
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection, an interest of the debtor in property 
becomes property of the estate . . . notwithstanding any 
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or 
applicable nonbankruptcy law- 
 
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest 
by the debtor . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 541 (emphasis added). As the legislative history 
for this section specifies, "The scope of this paragraph is 
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broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible 
or intangible property, causes of action . .. and all other 
forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the 
Bankruptcy Act . . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, the House Report clearly explained that 
the purpose of section 541 was to move away from the 
"complicated melange of references to State law," and to 
"determine[ ] what is property of the estate by a simple 
reference to what interests in property the debtor has at the 
commencement of the case. This includes all interests, 
such as . . . tangible and intangible property, choses in 
action, [and] causes of action . . . whether or not 
transferable by the debtor." Id. at 175-76, 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6136 (emphasis added). 
 
Relying on the legislative history and the obvious broad 
sweep of § 541(a)(1), numerous courts have concluded that 
"[s]ection 541 eliminated the requirement that property 
must be transferable or subject to process in order to 
become initially part of the estate." In re Geise, 992 F.2d 
651, 655 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also In re 
Cottrell, 876 F.2d 540, 542-43 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
a personal injury action was estate property 
notwithstanding that the action was nontransferable under 
Kentucky state law); Sierra Switchboard Co. v. 
Westinghouse Electric Co., 789 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 
1986) ("By adopting a comprehensive definition of property, 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act reduced the bankruptcy court's 
cumbersome reliance on state law analysis for determining 
property to be included in the estate."); Tignor v. Parkinson, 
729 F.2d 977, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that an 
unliquidated personal injury claim was estate property 
notwithstanding that the claim was nontransferable under 
Virginia law); see also L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, 
¶ 541.07 (15th ed. rev. 1996) ("[U]nder the Code, all 
interests of the debtor in property come into the estate 
pursuant to section 541(a)(1) regardless of whether they are 
transferable, or whether creditors could have by some 
means reached them."). These courts have clearly found 
that state laws restricting the transfer or assignment of 
property, including causes of action and personal injury 
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claims, do not preclude the property from passing to the 
bankrupt's estate under § 541. 
 
While we have not decided the issue, we have previously 
noted the broad sweep of § 541 and the fact that the 
section expressly includes "causes of action" as property 
interests included in the estate. See, e.g., In re Nejberger, 
934 F.2d 1300, 1301-02 (3d Cir. 1991); Counties 
Contracting & Constr. Co. v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 855 
F.2d 1054, 1057 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). Given § 541's broad 
scope, its legislative history, and the weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions, we conclude that state laws 
prohibiting the assignment or transfer of property, 
including causes of action and tort claims, do not prevent 
the inclusion of such property in the bankruptcy estate. 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly 
determined that Machine Technology's state law tort claims 




Having determined both that New Jersey law prohibits 
transferring the tort claims at issue here and that the tort 
claims were part of the property of the estate, we are left to 
decide whether the trustee in Machine Technology's 
bankruptcy was permitted to sell the company's 
prejudgment tort claims to Integrated notwithstanding clear 
New Jersey state law prohibiting the assignment. In 
essence, this question raises a basic preemption issue: 
whether Congress intended to permit bankruptcy trustees 
to dispose of tort claims belonging to the estate in violation 




We begin our analysis with the legal principles 
underlying the preemption doctrine. In In re Roach, 824 
F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (3d Cir. 1987), we examined the 
preemption issue specifically in the bankruptcy context. We 
began our analysis by noting that under Article I, § 8 of the 
Constitution, Congress has the power to establish uniform 
bankruptcy laws throughout the United States and thus, 
"[w]here Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, 
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contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way." 
Id. at 1373 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
Nonetheless, we immediately made clear that "the usual 
rule is that congressional intent to pre-empt will not be 
inferred lightly. Pre-emption must be either explicit, or 
compelled due to an unavoidable conflict between the state 
law and the federal law." Id. (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). Because we are reluctant to assume 
federal preemption, we noted that any analysis should 
begin with "the basic assumption that Congress did not 
intend to displace state law." Id. (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). Relying on these general observations, 
we said: 
 
Our task is to ascertain and give effect to congressional 
intent. However, we must approach that task with the 
realization that the Bankruptcy Code was written with 
the expectation that it would be applied in the context 
of state law and that federal courts are not licensed to 
disregard interests created by state law when that 
course is not clearly required to effectuate federal 
interests. 
 
Id. at 1374. Thus, under Roach we adopted a restrained 
approach to concluding that Congress has intended to 
preempt state law in the bankruptcy context.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our approach to preemption outside the bankruptcy context is 
similarly restrained when considering areas that have traditionally been 
governed by state law. For example, in Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 
682, 687 (3d Cir. 1994), we made the following observations in the 
context of determining whether certain provisions of CERCLA preempted 
a Delaware probate statute: 
 
In an area that has been traditionally occupied by the states, the 
court must assume that the prerogatives of the states were not to be 
superseded by a federal law unless it is the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress. . . . Indeed, for preemption to occur in a field 
traditionally occupied by the states, there must be a "sharp" conflict 
between state law and federal policy. 
 
Id. at 687 (citations omitted). Under this reasoning, since bankruptcy is 
a field traditionally occupied by the states, there must be a "sharp" 
conflict between state law and federal policy before we may conclude that 
federal law preempts state law in the bankruptcy context. 
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Supreme Court law attempting to balance federal and 
state law in the bankruptcy context has generally taken a 
similarly restrained approach to federal preemption. For 
example, in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54, 99 S. 
Ct. 914, 917-18 (1979), the Supreme Court emphasized 
that "Congress has generally left the determination of 
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state 
law." The Court then went on to instruct that: 
 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. 
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, 
there is no reason why such interests should be 
analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform 
treatment of property interests by both state and 
federal courts within a State serves to reduce 
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to 
prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by 
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy. 
 
Id. at 55, 99 S. Ct. at 918 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). Accordingly, the Butner court concluded that 
absent a countervailing federal interest, "the basic federal 
rule is that state law governs." Id. at 57, 99 S. Ct. at 919; 
see also Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 
329, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2110 (1993) ("In the absence of a 
controlling federal rule, we generally assume that Congress 
has left the determination of property rights in the assets of 
a bankrupt's estate to state law.") (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
Courts applying the Butner analysis have relied on its 
holding to conclude that "once a property interest has 
passed to the estate, it is subject to the same limitations 
imposed upon the debtor by applicable nonbankruptcy 
law." In re American Freight Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 952, 960 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); see also In re Transcon Lines, 58 
F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
"nonbankruptcy law defines the nature, scope, and extent 
of the property rights that come into the hands of the 
bankruptcy estate"), cert. denied sub nom. Gumport v. 
Sterling Press, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1016 (1996); In re Sanders, 
969 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A] bankruptcy trustee 
succeeds only to the title and rights in property that the 
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debtor had at the time she filed the bankruptcy petition."); 
In re FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 1149, 1153 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The 
estate under § 541(a) succeeds only to those interests that 
the debtor had in property prior to commencement of the 
bankruptcy case."); In re Bishop College, 151 B.R. 394, 398 
(Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1993) (holding that a bankrupt's estate 
receives trust assets "subject to any restrictions imposed by 
state law, pre-petition"). 
 
These cases stand for the proposition that unless federal 
bankruptcy law has specifically preempted a state law 
restriction imposed on property of the estate, the trustee's 
rights in the property are limited to only those rights that 
the debtor possessed pre-petition. In other words, without 
explicit federal preemption, the trustee does not have 
greater rights in the property of the estate than the debtor 
had before filing for bankruptcy. See L. King, Collier on 
Bankruptcy, ¶ 541.04 ("Although [section 541(a)(1)] includes 
choses in action and claims by the debtor against others, it 
is not intended to expand the debtor's rights against others 
beyond what rights existed at the commencement of the 
case."). 
 
Notwithstanding these general principles, Integrated 
argues that certain Bankruptcy Code provisions evince a 
clear congressional intent to preempt state law restrictions 
on assigning tort claims. Specifically, Integrated points to 
two separate Code provisions, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 
363(b)(1). Section 704 sets forth the trustee's duties, and 
subsection (1) instructs the trustee to "collect and reduce to 
money the property of the estate for which such trustee 
serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is 
compatible with the best interests of parties in interest 
. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 704(1). Somewhat similarly, section 363 
defines the permissible use, sale, or lease of estate 
property, with subsection (b)(1) specifying that "[t]he 
trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, 
other than in the ordinary course of business, property of 
the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). 
 
These Code provisions, Integrated argues, demonstrate 
that the "overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is the 
expeditious and equitable distribution of the assets of the 
debtor's estate." Appellant's Br. at 17. Moreover, Integrated 
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contends that these provisions create an affirmative 
obligation on the trustee's part to dispose of the estate's 
assets as quickly and efficiently as possible, in order to 
maximize the potential return to creditors. In light of these 
express purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, Integrated 
argues, New Jersey's state law prohibiting the assignment 
of tort claims is in direct conflict with federal bankruptcy 
law and must be preempted. 
 
Integrated's arguments, however, lack adequate legal 
support. For starters, neither § 363(b)(1) nor § 704(1) 
expressly authorizes the trustee to sell property in violation 
of state law transfer restrictions. Moreover, Integrated 
points to nothing in the legislative history that would even 
raise an inference that Congress intended to give the 
trustee such authority under these provisions. The clear 
lack of Congressional intent to preempt state law 
restrictions on transferring property of the estate is even 
more telling given the explicit language that Congress uses 
when it intends to displace state nonbankruptcy law in 
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 1123(a) ("Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, a [reorganization] plan shall . . ."); 11 
U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) ("[A]n interest of the debtor in property 
becomes property of the estate . . . notwithstanding any 
provision in . . . applicable nonbankruptcy law (A) that 
restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the 
debtor . . ."); 11 U.S.C. § 728(b) ("Notwithstanding any State 
or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the 
trustee shall make tax returns of income . . . only if [the] 
estate or corporation has net taxable income for the entire 
period after the order for relief under this chapter during 
which the case is pending."); 11 U.S.C. § 363(l) ("Subject to 
the provisions of section 365, the trustee may use, sell, or 
lease property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section . . . 
notwithstanding any provision in . . . applicable law that is 
conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor . . ."). Because both Code provisions relied upon by 
Integrated fail to explicitly express Congress's intent to 
supersede state law restrictions on the transfer of estate 
property, Integrated's preemption claim is rendered wholly 
unconvincing, especially in light of our strong presumption 
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against inferring Congressional preemption in the 
bankruptcy context. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1373-74. 
 
In addition, there is case law from other circuits that 
directly cuts against Integrated's position. For example, in 
In re Schauer, 835 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), the court 
rejected an argument that federal bankruptcy law 
preempted a Minnesota farm cooperative statute, and a 
cooperative's bylaws promulgated thereunder, which 
imposed transfer restrictions on a "patronage margin 
certificate" held by the debtor and passed to the 
bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541. In reaching its 
decision, the court held that since state law defined the 
debtor's interest in property that became part of the estate, 
"§§ 363(b)(1) and 704 do not conflict with or invalidate the 
bylaws' restriction on transferability . . . ." 835 F.2d at 
1225. The Schauer court further reasoned: 
 
[T]here is no conflict between 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 
704, and state law which defines the debtor's rights in 
property of the estate. Sections 363(b)(1) and 704 do 
not expressly authorize the trustee to sell property 
contrary to the restrictions imposed by state and 
contract law. These sections are simply enabling 
statutes that give the trustee the authority to sell or 
dispose of property if the debtors would have had the 
same right under state law. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Significantly, other courts have followed the Schauer 
court's lead and also held that §§ 363(b)(1) and 704 are 
general enabling provisions that do not expand or change a 
debtor's interest in property merely because itfiles a 
bankruptcy petition. See, e.g., In re FCX, 853 F.2d at 1155 
("Neither § 363(b)(1), nor § 704, is an empowering statute in 
the sense that new rights or powers for dealing with the 
property of the estate are created. . . . [They] evince[ ] no 
intent to enlarge the trustee's rights to take such actions 
beyond the debtor's pre-bankruptcy rights."); In re Bishop 
College, 151 B.R. at 398-99 (holding that § 704 is merely an 
enabling statute that gives the trustee the authority to 
dispose of property "if the Debtor would have had the same 
rights under state law"). The reasoning of these cases is 
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persuasive and we conclude that neither § 363(b)(1) nor 
§ 704(1) indicates a specific congressional intent to preempt 
state laws limiting the assignability of tort claims belonging 
to the estate. Since Machine Technology would have been 
prohibited from assigning its prejudgment tort claims under 
New Jersey state law, the trustee in Machine Technology's 
bankruptcy was subject to the same restriction. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trustee lacked legal authority 
to assign the tort claims and hence, Integrated does not 
have standing to pursue its state law tort claims. 
 
We realize that the events giving rise to the prejudgment 
tort claims at issue in this case occurred after Machine 
Technology filed its petition for bankruptcy relief under 
Chapter 11. This fact, however, does not change our 
analysis. In our view, absent specific Congressional intent 
to preempt state law restrictions imposed on property of the 
estate, the trustee's rights in the estate property are limited 
to only those rights that the debtor possessed, or would 
have possessed, pre-petition. This is the case regardless of 
whether the tort claims arise before or after a debtor's 
property has passed to the bankruptcy estate. 
 
Indeed, drawing a distinction between prejudgment tort 
claims that arise before a debtor files a petition for 
bankruptcy and those that arise after the petition is filed is 
problematic for several reasons. First, there is simply no 
legal precedent for recognizing such a distinction. Second, 
regardless of whether prejudgment tort claims arise before 
or after a petition for bankruptcy has been filed, once the 
bankruptcy case commences the claims belong to the 
property of the estate and hence should be subject to 
identical treatment, absent a specific Congressional intent 
to augment the property rights inherent in the tort claims 
arising post-petition. 
 
Finally, drawing a distinction between prejudgment tort 
claims arising pre- and post-petition is untenable in the 
case of Chapter 11 reorganizations where the debtor 
remains in possession of the property of the estate. In such 
cases, the debtor-in-possession, "subject to any limitations 
on a trustee serving in a case under [Chapter 11], and to 
such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes . . . 
shall have all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform 
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all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a 
case under [Chapter 11]." 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); see also In 
re Coastal Group, Inc., 13 F.3d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("Section 1107(a) . . . extends the rights, powers and duties 
of a trustee to a debtor-in-possession subject to any 
limitations imposed upon a trustee."). Permitting debtors- 
in-possession to freely assign prejudgment tort claims in 
violation of state laws restricting the transfer of such 
claims, solely because the claims happen to arise after the 
debtor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, is tantamount to 
expanding the pre-petition rights of the debtor in the 
property of the estate simply because the debtor has 
commenced bankruptcy proceedings and become a debtor- 
in-possession. This is akin to providing the debtor with "a 
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy," Butner, 440 U.S. at 55, 99 S.Ct. at 918, an 
outcome clearly in tension with the purposes of the Code 




As a final argument for preemption, Integrated contends 
that permitting the operation of New Jersey law will cause 
significant problems in actual bankruptcy practice. To 
support its argument, Integrated raises two separate 
concerns. First, Integrated asserts that unless bankruptcy 
trustees are permitted to sell tort claims belonging to the 
estate, most claims will be abandoned by trustees because 
of the time and money required to pursue the claims in 
court. This result will in turn, Integrated argues, frustrate 
the Code's purpose of ensuring the expeditious and 
equitable distribution of the debtor's estate. Second, 
Integrated maintains that permitting New Jersey law to 
operate in the bankruptcy context will create the negative 
incentive of encouraging other corporate officers to engage 
in the type of tortious behavior exhibited by Machine 
Technology's former officers in this case without fear of 
recourse for their wrongful conduct. We should not, 
Integrated warns, permit either federal bankruptcy law or 
state law, to promote such behavior. 
 
Neither policy concern is particularly persuasive. With 
respect to Integrated's first argument, although we 
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recognize that state law restrictions on the transferability of 
tort claims could possibly impose additional litigation 
burdens on the trustee and adversely affect creditors 
waiting for estate liquidation, there are a number of 
counterbalancing factors to consider. First, we do not 
believe that bankruptcy trustees will be forced to abandon 
all tort claims belonging to the estate because of the time 
and resources necessary to sue on the claims. Rather, it is 
more likely that trustees will weigh the costs and benefits 
associated with pursuing each set of claims and prosecute 
those tort claims which, ex ante, promise to result in a net 
economic benefit to the estate and its creditors-- 
something every potential litigator should do. 
 
Second, by refusing to find preemption of state law 
restrictions on the transferability of estate property, we are 
giving effect to an equally important purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code: namely, upholding the fundamental 
principle that the estate succeeds only to the nature and 
the rights of the property interest that the debtor possessed 
pre-petition. Indeed, were we to find federal preemption of 
the state law restrictions at issue here, the trustee would 
possess greater rights in the property interest than the 
debtor. Clearly, unless the Code expressly indicates an 
intention to augment the rights and nature of the property 
interest in bankruptcy, the trustee only succeeds to the 
same rights the debtor possessed in the property pre- 
petition. 
 
With respect to Integrated's second argument, it is 
misleading to suggest that unless we find federal 
preemption under the circumstances of this case, 
individuals will be permitted to engage in strategic, tortious 
behavior without fear of recourse. Indeed, this argument 
ignores the fact that the bankruptcy trustee retains the 
power to pursue state law tort claims against tortfeasors, 
thus subjecting them to civil and criminal liability for their 
wrongful conduct. Moreover, as noted above, we believe 
that bankruptcy trustees are likely to prosecute all tort 
claims that will potentially result in a net economic benefit 
to the estate. As such, contrary to Integrated's warnings, 
the failure to find federal preemption here does not give 
tortfeasors a "free ride" to engage in tortious behavior and 
to abuse the Code's protections. 
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IV. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the trustee lacked the 
authority to assign Machine Technology's state law tort 
claims to Integrated, and hence, Integrated lacks standing 
to sue on its state law tort claims. We will affirm the order 
of the district court. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority holds that the trustee in bankruptcy may 
not transfer the estate's pre-judgment tort claim in the 
absence of specific federal law preemption. The predicate 
for its holding is that "the trustee's rights in the property 
are limited to only those rights that the debtor possessed 
pre-petition." Maj. op. at 11. The debtor in this case, 
however, never possessed the rights of action in issue. The 
rights enured only to the trustee because the alleged claims 
of misappropriation of confidential information, conversion 
and other torts were committed against the estate after 
Machine Technology, Inc. ("MTI") had filed its petition for 
bankruptcy and while the estate property was in the hands 
of the trustee. Thus, the tort claims accrued solely to the 
trustee and their transfer in no way expands or alters the 
property interest possessed by the debtor when itfiled its 
bankruptcy petition. 
 
Neutralizing the power and duty of the trustee to dispose 
of these choses of action will deprive the trustee and the 
creditors of the estate of $100,000 which Integrated 
Solutions, Inc. ("Integrated") paid the trustee. If the transfer 
made by the trustee and approved by the bankruptcy court 
is invalidated, winding up the estate must be deferred and 
maximization of benefits to creditors is deferred, all in the 
face of no prejudice to anyone having an honest interest in 
the estate and no offense to any specific identifiable 




MTI filed for Chapter 11 protection on July 22, 1994. 
Integrated charges that on August 1 and 2, 1994, the 
individual defendants, former officers and employees of 
MTI, removed confidential files, drawings, and schematics 
from MTI's office while they were in the possession of the 
trustee in bankruptcy. Thus, the covert, unauthorized 
removal violated federal bankruptcy law. On August 3, the 
bankruptcy judge issued a bench order vacating the 
automatic stay provision of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and directing the turnover of the collateral to the 
secured creditors, including all assets of MTI. The formal 
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order directing this turnover was entered on August 22, 
1994. Integrated, engaged in the manufacture, sale and 
repair service of Photolite lithography equipment, bought 
the property from the secured creditors on September 6, 
1994, for the sum of $800,000. Accordingly, these tort 
claims, which accrued after the property was in the 
bankruptcy estate, are subject to federal law. Their 
assignability should not be subject to the restrictions on 
assignability of pre-judgment tort claims imposed under 
arcane and obscure state common law. 
 
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is 
the expeditious and equitable distribution of the assets of 
the debtor's estate. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc. , 856 F.2d 12, 
15 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Midlantic National Bank v. New 
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 508 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Thus, absent a restriction 
imposed by state law, there would be no problem in the free 
alienation of these pre-judgment tort claims under federal 
law. The majority believes that New Jersey's unexplained 
common law against the sale or assignment of pre- 
judgment tort claims should apply in this case because the 
trustee has no greater rights in the property in the estate 
than the debtor had prior to the filing for bankruptcy. 
 
The tort claims, however, were never the property of the 
debtor and first appeared in the bankruptcy estate only 
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, the claims 
are and has always been the sole and exclusive property of 
the trustee. He is duty bound to expeditiously dispose of it, 
as he must with the rest of the estate property, and that 
disposition should not be obstructed by an inexplicable 
state common law rule of inalienation merely because the 
debtor would have been bound by it. The transfer on its 
face shows no threat to public health, public safety, the 
state legal system, or any identifiable harm. On the other 
hand, "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the 
United States Constitution, when enforcement of a state 
law or regulation would undermine or stand as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress in enacting a federal statute, the conflict must 
be resolved in favor of the federal law. The overriding 
purpose of the Code is the expeditious and equitable 
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distribution of assets of the debtor's estate." Smith- 
Douglass, 856 F.2d at 15 (citations omitted). 
 
To facilitate this goal, the court in Smith-Douglass even 
permitted a trustee to unconditionally abandon a fertilizer 
plant, which contained violations of state environmental 
laws and regulations, where the estate lacked 
unencumbered assets with which to pay for clean-up and 
the plant itself did not present any imminent health or 
safety risks to the public. Id. at 16. Accord New Jersey 
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. North Am. Products Acquisition 
Corp., 137 B.R. 8 (D.N.J. 1992). In this case, the transfer of 
the tort claims pales into insignificance in offending state 
law. Although recognizing that preemption by the 
Supremacy Clause is a matter of congressional interest, 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941), the Court 
did not suggest that an impractical obtuse "disruption of 
effectual administration of bankrupt estates under the Code 
was appropriate." Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 16. "It is 
clear that if an identifiable federal interest is present and 
overriding, then recognition of a restriction to liquidate by 
agreement or state law must fail." See In re Baquet, 61 B.R. 
495, 500 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986). 
 
A bankruptcy trustee, accorded the duty of managing the 
property in the estate and disposing of the assets, has a 
clear interest in protecting that property from 
misappropriation; otherwise the property loses value and 
diminishes the money that can be brought into the estate 
through the liquidation of assets to satisfy the creditors. 
This interest is even greater when the tortious conduct is 
committed against the property while it is in the 
bankruptcy estate, as opposed to pre-petition tort claims. It 
is analogous to certain crimes which become federal crimes 
only because they occurred on federal property. Although 
there may be no difference in the conduct itself, an assault 
which takes place on federal land (such as a national park) 
will be subject to federal law while one which occurs on any 
other property will be governed by state law. The federal 
interest is paramount because the act has been committed 
against property under the control of the federal 
government. 
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Moreover, the cases relied on by the majority for the 
proposition that state law restrictions imposed on the 
assignability are distinguishable. None of those cases 
involved tortious conduct committed against the debtor's 
property after it was part of the bankruptcy estate and in 
federal custody. In those cases, the estate property subject 
to the restrictions on alienability belonged to the debtor 
prior to the bankruptcy. 
 
One of the principal cases relied upon by the majority is 
In re Schauer, 835 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), which I 
believe is clearly inapposite. In Schauer, there was an 
attempt "to expand or change a debtor's interest in property 
merely because it filed a bankruptcy petition." Maj. op. at 
13. There, the question was whether the trustee could 
transfer patronage margin certificates of a farm cooperative 
without the cooperative's approval. The patronage margin 
certificates are evidence of the ownership and interest in 
the cooperative and in the patron's revolving fund. Schauer, 
835 F.2d at 1223. The cooperative's by-laws provided for 
redemption and barred any assignment of interest in the 
revolving fund without the consent of the board of 
directors. Id. at 1223-34. The trustee for the Schauers, who 
had filed for bankruptcy, requested the board of directors of 
the cooperative to consent to the assignment of the 
certificates to third parties, but the board refused in 
accordance with its standard business practice. Id. at 1224. 
The trustee sought the aid of the court to compel the 
transfer, but the court correctly held that the trustee 
acquired the certificates subject to the cooperative's by-laws 
and could not transfer or assign them without the consent 
of its board of directors. Id. at 1225. In the instant matter, 
however, the tort claims were never the property of the 
debtor and, of course, were never the subject of contractual 
limitations as in Schauer. Thus, the rule that the trustee 
succeeds only to the title and rights in property that the 
debtor had at the time he or she filed the bankruptcy 
petition, see In re Sanders, 969 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 
1992), has no relevance here. 
 
Furthermore, no compelling rationale exists for 
preventing the sale or assignment in this case. On the 
contrary, the estate and all interested parties would be best 
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served by allowing the transfer of the claims, as the 
bankruptcy court did, to Integrated. The sale of the tangible 
assets of the bankrupt estate could be seriously hindered if 
the purchaser cannot acquire the accompanying tort claims 
upon which the full value of the property may depend. For 
example, in the present situation, it is unlikely that 
Integrated would have purchased the tangible property in 
question if they knew that they would lack standing to 
retrieve the confidential files, drawings and schematics 
misappropriated by the tortfeasors or to obtain damages. 
Thus, barring the transfer of the tort claims can in certain 
situations have the destructive effect of also obstructing the 
sale of the assets in the estate, in contradiction to the 
overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
The majority expresses a concern that allowing the sale 
and transfer of a pre-judgment tort claim is "untenable" in 
case of Chapter 11 reorganizations where the debtor 
remains in possession of the estate property. Maj. op. at 14. 
This is a needless fear. So long as the debtor remains in 
possession, it bears essentially the same fiduciary 
obligation to the creditors as does the trustee for the debtor 
out of possession. "Moreover, the duties which the . . . 
Debtor in possession must perform during the proceeding 
are substantially those imposed upon the Trustee, § 188." 
Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649 (1962). Accord Matter 
of Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1987). If property 
of the debtor is wrongfully removed or stolen by a third 
party, recovery by the debtor's estate as in the case of 
property in the hands of a trustee, poses no harm to 
anyone except to the tortfeasor. 
 
The majority's concern that permitting debtors-in- 
possession to freely assign pre-judgment tort claims"in 
violation of state laws restricting the transfer of such claims 
. . . is tantamount to expanding the pre-petition rights of 
the debtor in the property of the estate," maj. op. at 15, is 
more imaginary than real. First, transfers are not made 
wide and loose but only for a valuable consideration to the 
bankrupt estate, and, as in this case, with the approval of 
the court. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). Moreover, the situation 
here is one where the estate itself has been deliberately 
injured by dishonest tortfeasors. Second, the transfer is not 
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made in violation of any state legislative enactment; under 
the harshest interpretation, the assignment may 
superficially conflict with an obscure judicial concept. 
Third, the transfer neither offends nor alters the property 
interest of any party. As in the case of the trustee, the right 
to transfer tort claims committed against the debtor-in- 
possession facilitates its reorganization and expeditiously 
maximizes the estate for the benefit of creditors. 
 
The defendants do not offer a sufficient answer when 
they assert the trustee may litigate the tort claim. This 
presupposes that the trustee has the funds to carry on the 
litigation, and appeals if necessary, and that the purchaser 
of the tangible assets is willing to stand by and wait. 
Moreover, if the trustee cannot transfer the claims, 
insufficient resources may compel him to abandon the 
claim rather than litigate it and thus diminish the value of 
the bankruptcy estate left for the creditors. Accordingly, 
common sense, fairness, and pragmatism dictate that the 
trustee be permitted to sell and transfer the pre-judgment 




Given the very specific facts of the present situation, in 
which the alleged tort occurred while the debtor's property 
was in the custody of the federal bankruptcy trustee, 
federal law governs the alienability of the property. The 
trustee may not be subjected to the state common law 
restrictions prohibiting the assignment of pre-judgment tort 
claims. Therefore, I would vacate the order of the district 
court granting Service Specialties' motion for summary 
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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